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Abstract
In the 1950s, the Nobel Prize winner John F. Nash has shown that
under certain conditions, the best solution to the bargaining problem
is when the product of the (increase in) utilities is the largest. Nash’s
derivation assumed that we are looking for strategies that assign a single
situation to each bargaining situation. In this paper, we propose a
simplified derivation of Nash bargaining solution that does not requires
this assumption.
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1

Need for Cooperative Decision Making: Reminder

One of the main objectives of decision making theory and game theory is
to provide reasonable solutions to situations in which different participants
have different preferences. In particular, in cooperative games, we consider
situations in which, in principle, if all the participants cooperate, they can
reach situations which are preferable to the status quo for each of them.
To describe solutions to such problems, we first need to describe the preferences of individual players. In the standard decision making theory (see, e.g.,
[5, 6, 8]), these preferences are described by the corresponding utility values.
These numerical values come from the observation that we can have a numerical scale for describing the person’s preferences by using probabilities in the
following way. We select two alternatives:
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• a very negative alternative A0 ; e.g., an alternative in which the decision
maker loses all his money (and/or loses his health as well), and
• a very positive alternative A1 ; e.g., an alternative in which the decision
maker wins several million dollars.
Based on these two alternatives, we can, for every value p ∈ [0, 1], consider
a randomized alternative L(p) in which we get A1 with probability p and A0
with probability 1 − p.
When p = 1, we get the favorable alternative A1 (with probability 1), and
when p = 0, we get the unfavorable alternative A0 . In general, the larger the
probability p of the favorable alternative A1 , the more preferable is the corresponding randomized alternative L(p). Thus, the corresponding randomized
alternatives (“lotteries”) L(p) form a continuous 1-D scale ranging from the
very negative alternative A0 to the very positive alternative A1 .
So, it is reasonable to gauge the preference of an arbitrary alternative A
by comparing it to different alternatives L(p) from this scale until we find A’s
place on this scale, i.e., the value p ∈ [0, 1] for which, to this decision maker,
the alternative A is equivalent to L(p): L(p) ∼ A. This value is called the
utility u(A) of the alternative A in the standard decision making theory.
In our definition, the numerical value of the utility depends on the selection
of the alternatives A0 and A1 : e.g., A0 is the alternative whose utility is 0 and
A1 is the alternative whose utility is 1. It is possible to show that if we use
a different set of alternatives A00 and A01 , then the new utility value u0 (A) is
obtained from the original one by a linear transformation u0 (A) = λ · u(A) + b.
In particular, if only consider scales in which, as A0 , we take the status quo
point S, then we get u(S) = u0 (S) = 0 and thus, b = 0. In this case, utility is
defined modulo re-scaling u0 (A) = λ · u(A), with λ > 0.
When we have several (n) participants, each alternative A is characterized by n utility values u1 (A), . . . , un (A) that describe the preference of the
corresponding participants. Based on these values, we need to select one (or
several) alternatives.

2

Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Original
Derivation

In his 1950 paper [7], the Nobel Prize winner John F. Nash proposed to select
an alternative for which the product

n
Q

i=1

ui of the utility values is the largest

possible. This solution is called the Nash bargaining solution.
This solution does not change if we re-scale all the utilities, i.e., if we replace
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each utility combination (u1 , . . . , un ) with a new combination
(λ1 · u1 , . . . , λn · un ).
Indeed, after this re-scaling, the objective function is simply multiplied by a
positive constant λ1 · . . . · λn and thus, it attains the largest value on exactly
the same alternative(s).
This solution is also symmetric in the sense that it does not change if we
rename the original participants, i.e., for example, if we replace each combination (u1 , u2 , u3 , . . . , un ) with a combination (u2 , u1 , u3 , . . . , un ). Nash has
proven that if we have a strategy that assigns, to every set of possible alternatives, a single alternative, and if this strategy is invariant with respect
to re-scaling and re-naming, then this strategy must coincide with the Nash
bargaining solution.

3

What We Plan to Do

In this paper, we show that when we derive the Nash bargaining solution, we
do not need to assume that only one alternative is selected. The new derivation
is even simpler than the original one.
Comments.
• It is interesting to mention that while the derivation of Nash solution was
only found in 1950, the solution itself was already proposed in economics
in 1930 [11]. The mathematical equivalence of Zeuthen’s and Nash’s
solutions was shown in [3].
• It is also worth mentioning that since the original 1950 paper, many other
alternative derivations of Nash bargaining solution and its generalizations
have been proposed; see, e.g., [1, 2, 4, 9, 10] and references therein. Some
of these derivations show that it is not necessary to assume that we simply
select between pairs of alternatives; some other derivations show what
happens if we do not require re-naming invariance (i.e., if we do not
assume that all the participants are equal), etc.

4

New Derivation: Description

We want to make a selection between different alternatives
by
³ characterized
´
def
+ n
different values of the utility vector ~u = (u1 , . . . , un ) ∈ IR0 , where IR+
0
denotes the set of all non-negative real numbers. To describe this selection, let
us first describe the equivalence relation ~u ∼ ~v between such vectors meaning
that the alternatives corresponding to ~u and ~v are equally reasonable to select.
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In terms of this equivalence relation, the invariance requirements take the
following form.
Definition 4.1
• We say that an equivalence relation ∼ is scale-invariant if for every λ1 >
0, . . . , λn > 0, (u1 , . . . , un ) ∼ (v1 , . . . , vn ) implies
(λ1 · u1 , . . . , λn · un ) ∼ (λ1 · v1 , . . . , λn · vn ).
• We say that an equivalent relation ∼ is symmetric if (u1 , . . . , un ) ∼
(uπ(1) , . . . , uπ(n) ) for every permutation π.
Comment. In particular, for π : 1 ↔ 2, we have
(u1 , u2 , u3 , . . . , un ) ∼ (u2 , u1 , u3 , . . . , un ).
Theorem 4.2 For every scale-invariant symmetric equivalence relation ∼,
we have (u1 , . . . , un ) ∼ (u1 · . . . · un , 1, . . . , 1).
Proof. Due to symmetry, we have (1, u2 , u3 , . . . , un ) ∼ (u2 , 1, u3 , . . . , un ). By
applying scale-invariance with λ1 = u1 , we conclude that (u1 , u2 , u3 , . . . , un ) ∼
(u1 · u2 , 1, u3 , . . . , un ). By applying a similar idea to the 1st and the 3rd participants, we get (u1 · u2 , 1, u3 , u4 , . . . , un ) ∼ (u1 · u2 · u3 , 1, 1, u4 , . . . , un ) and
thus, since ∼ is the equivalence relation, that
(u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 . . . , un ) ∼ (u1 · u2 · u3 , 1, 1, u4 , . . . , un ).
By applying this same idea to the 1st and 4th, 1st and 5th, etc., we get the
desired equivalence. The theorem is proven.
Discussion. Because of the theorem, the quality of each alternative is uniquely
determined by Nash’s product of the utilities – in the sense that every two
alternatives with the same product value are equivalent.
If we have two alternative with two different values of the product U < V ,
then U is equivalent to the vector (U 1/n , . . . , U 1/n ) with the same product, and
V is equivalent to the vector (V 1/n , . . . , V 1/n ). Here U 1/n < V 1/n , hence for the
second vector, every participant gets a larger utility. Thus, the second vector
is clearly better.
Thus, we should select an alternative for which the product attains the
largest possible value. Nash’s idea has been indeed justified – without the
original Nash’s assumption that there is only one selected vector of utilities.
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